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Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert: How the I.R.S.
Stole Hubert’s Blessing
Kristen E. Caverly*
THE CASE
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert1 is a plurality opinion finding no
reduction in an estate tax marital or charitable deduction when an estate
administrator has undisputed discretion to (and does) pay certain administrative expenses using post-mortem income derived from an estate’s marital and charitable shares. The expenses allocated to income
were not considered a “material limitation” on the spouse’s/charity’s
right to receive income such that the expenses affected the valuation of
those interests and consequently the associated deductions.2 The estate
thus received a $1.5 million income tax deduction without any attendant
reduction in the marital and charitable deductions. Since the administrative expenses at issue were not taken into account in valuing the dateof-death marital or charitable deduction assets, the estate essentially received two deductions for the price of one.
Mr. Hubert died in 1986 as a resident of Georgia with an estate
valued at more than $30 million. After his death, the estate incurred
substantial litigation expenses, most of which related to the distribution
of assets pursuant to claims of undue influence, fraud and related causes
of action. In 1987, the executors filed the federal estate tax return. In
1990, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency claiming underreporting of approximately $14 million. The major challenge was to the
estate’s claimed entitlement to marital and charitable deductions. The
estate petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.3
Within days of that petition, the litigation settled, with the settlement
dividing $26 million of the date-of-death residue assets between trusts
for decedent’s widow and charities. The Commissioner conceded that
the charitable and marital gifts agreed to in the settlement qualified for
deductions under Code sections 2055 and 2056, respectively.4
* Kristen E. Caverly is a founding partner in the California firm of Henderson,
Caverly, Pum & Charney LLP. Ms. Caverly specializes in trust and estate litigation.
1 520 U.S. 93 (1997).
2 Id. at 107.
3 Id. at 98.
4 Id.

107

108

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:107

Consistent with decedent’s last will and Georgia law, the settlement
provided discretion to pay administration expenses from principal or income. Actual administrative expenses were on the order of $2 million.
The executors allocated $500,000 to principal and the remaining $1.5
million to income. The estate recalculated its marital and charitable deductions, reducing those values only by the expenses allocated to
principal.
In considering the recalculated deductions taken pursuant to the
underlying settlement agreement, the Commissioner contended that the
use of post-mortem income to pay administration expenses also required a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the marital and charitable deductions paying those expenses.5 The estate disagreed. The Tax Court
rejected that position “on the facts before [it],”6 noting that it had resolved the same issue against the Commissioner in Estate of Street v.
Commissioner,7 and acknowledging that the Sixth Circuit reversed this
aspect of Estate of Street.8 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting the
resulting conflict with Estate of Street and with Burke v. United States.9
For Supreme Court review, the parties agreed that interpretation of
the regulations requires the same result with respect to both the marital
deduction and the charitable deduction, notwithstanding the more specific provisions of the marital deduction regulations.10 The Court
agreed with this approach; the holding applies to valuing assets for both
deductions.11
For the plurality, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, analyzed the issue as one of
date-of-death valuation of the deductible assets under the controlling
regulation, versus qualification for the deduction under the controlling
statute.12 The plurality relied on the language of Treasury Regulation
5

Id. at 99.
Estate of Hubert v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 314, 325 (1993).
7 Id. at 326; see Estate of Street v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-553, 56 T.C.M.
(CCH) 774, 777 (1988) (administration expenses chargeable against income do not reduce amount of principal eligible for marital deduction).
8 Estate of Hubert, 101 T.C. at 326; see Estate of Street v. Comm’r, 974 F.2d 723,
728-29 (6th Cir. 1992).
9 994 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See Estate of Hubert v. Comm’r, 63 F.3d 1083,
1083 (11th Cir. 1995).
10 Comm’r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 100 (1997). The then-regulations read
in part, “In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from
the property.” Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (1994) (emphasis added) (superseded by
1999 amendment).
11 Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. at 100.
12 Id. at 104-06.
6
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20.2056(b)-4(a).13 Turning then to valuation principals, the plurality
reasoned that the materiality of a limitation providing that income is to
be used throughout administration to pay expenses is a factual determination.14 Factors relevant to materiality include how much income is
likely to be earned during administration versus the amount of anticipated administrative expenses, whether the deductible gift and its income-earning potential is large or small relative to the estate, whether
the deductible gift is in trust, etc.15 Weighing this slim record, the Court
concluded that discretion to pay administrative expenses out of income
was not a material limitation on the right to receive income and, therefore, allocation of administrative expenses to income did not trigger a
reduction in the claimed deductions.16 The plurality did not reach the
more challenging question of what reduction would be applicable if a
limitation were material.17
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Thomas, harshly criticizes the Commissioner for regulations which
do not clearly define “material limitation” and for not arguing or putting
forth a record in this case as to what level of expenses would qualify as
material.18 Justice O’Connor also found significant Revenue Ruling 9348,19 which provides that the marital deduction is not ordinarily reduced
when an executor allocates interest payments on deferred federal estate
taxes to the spouse’s post-mortem income.20 Because interest payments
do not reduce the marital deduction per the Commissioner’s admission,
Justice O’Connor reasoned that the Court could not adopt the Commissioner’s argument that every financial burden on a marital bequest’s
post-mortem income is a material limitation warranting a reduction in
the deduction.21
Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justice Breyer, argued that the
marital and charitable deductions must be reduced whenever postmortem income from those shares is used to pay administrative expenses because, unlike anticipated future income, the gross estate for
13
14
15

Id. at 105.
Id.
Id. at 106-07 (analyzing factors impacting materiality in Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-

(4)(a)).
16

Id. at 107.
The Commissioner’s request for a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the gross date-ofdeath value is not consistent with normal valuation principals. The gross estate includes a
discounted value of anticipated post-mortem income earned during administration. See
id. at 108-09.
18 See id. at 121-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
19 Rev. Rul. 93-48, 1993-2 C.B. 271.
20 Comm’r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 118 (1997).
21 Id. at 119 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
17

110

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:107

federal estate tax purposes does not take account of anticipated administrative expenses.22 A deduction for actual administration expenses,
not a reduction in the estate’s gross value, is provided under section
2053(a)(2).23 In Justice Scalia’s view, if income from a spousal bequest
is used to pay administrative expenses, the spouse then receives less income than was projected in valuing the bequest resulting in an inflated
deduction.24
THE AFTERMATH –
TREAS. REG. § 20.2056(B)-4 AND TREAS. REG. § 20.2055-3
In describing the Supreme Court many years ago, Justice Robert H.
Jackson wrote in an opinion not long before his own death, “We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final.”25 Not so in the arena of tax regulation interpretation. It is the
I.R.S. that has the final say. As Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
observed:
There is no reason why this labyrinth should exist, especially
when the Commissioner is empowered to promulgate new regulations and make the answer clear. Indeed, nothing prevents
the Commissioner from announcing by regulation the very position she advances in this litigation.26
In direct response to Estate of Hubert, the Commissioner promulgated new regulations removing any distinction between paying with income or principal in favor of an inquiry into the nature of the expense
and whether the expense has been deducted. For decedents dying on or
after December 3, 1999, the marital deduction is to be reduced by: (1)
the amount of “estate transmission expenses” paid from the marital
share, whether from income or principal; (2) the amount of “estate management expenses” paid from the marital share where such expenses
were not attributable to the marital share; and (3) the amount of “estate
management expenses” attributable to the marital share that are deducted from the gross taxable estate as administrative expenses under
section 2053.”27 “Management expenses” are defined as expenses “incurred in connection with the investment of estate assets or with their
preservation or maintenance during a reasonable period of administra22

Id. at 122-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 125 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 123 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
26 Comm’r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 122 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
27 Treas. Reg. 20.2056(b)-4(d)(2), (3); see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-3(b) (applicable
to charitable deduction).
23
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tion.”28 “Transmission expenses” are expenses that “would not have
been incurred but for the decedent’s death and the consequent necessity
of collecting the decedent’s assets, paying the decedent’s debts and
death taxes, and distributing the decedent’s property to those who are
entitled to receive it.”29 Examples of transmission expenses are executor and attorney fees, probate fees, expenses incurred in construction
proceedings and will contests, and appraisal fees. Unlike transmission
expenses, management expenses could be avoided or managed by a sale
or distribution of the asset. Consequently, management expenses generally do not reduce the value of the marital deduction property as of the
decedent’s date of death.
THE CONCLUSION
As observed by Justice Kennedy, “[i]n consequence of life’s two
certainties a decedent’s estate faced federal estate tax deficiencies, giving rise to this case.”30 The Supreme Court then interpreted “any material limitation upon her right to income from the property” so as to
reduce the consequences of the second certainty for Mr. Hubert’s beneficiaries.31 Perhaps spurred on by Justice O’Connor’s harsh assessment
of the lack of clarity and logic in the applicable law, the I.R.S. issued
post-Hubert regulations compelling the dollar-for-dollar reduction of
the marital/charitable deductions whether or not paid with income or
principal. These new regulations moot the benefit of granting the trustee/executor discretion to allocate transmission expenses between income and principal.
Now, the value of property qualifying for the marital and charitable
deductions is reduced by all administrative expenses incurred to transfer
the property from decedent to the beneficiary, all asset management expenses related to non-deductible shares which are paid for by deductible
shares, and all asset management expenses paid by the deductible shares
which have been deducted for federal estate tax purposes under Section
2053. No more can one allocate expenses incurred in passing deductible
property to income for purposes of taking an income tax deduction
without a reduction in the date-of-death valuation of the transferred
property.
Upon considering the post-Hubert regulatory changes and given the
many issues of public importance vying for Supreme Court attention in
a land of 200 million actual and potential taxpayers, one must consider
whether interpreting I.R.S. regulations is a good use of the Court’s valu28
29
30
31

Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(d)(i); see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-3(b)(i)-(iii).
Treas. Reg. 2056(b)-4(d)(ii); see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-3(b)(ii).
Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. at 97.
Id. at 105.
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able time. It is tempting to argue that the split in the circuits justifies
review so that federal law is applied uniformly. However, where the
Commissioner can and does circumvent the Supreme Court’s decisions
for future taxpayers, what is the point? Perhaps the point of Supreme
Court review is just what happened in and after Estate of Hubert;
namely, where the federal tax law is so unclear as to take up multiple
court resources leading to different results on similar facts, it will take a
shaming by the Supreme Court to spur the Commissioner to change.

